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3. Re-Interpreting the Umma: Islamic Nationalism and 
Transnationalism  
 
Introduction 
 
Integral to the resurgence of Islam have been the growing significance of the umma 
(Islamic ‘community’) and the perceptions of a global Muslim community or nation.  
Reasons for these trans-national feelings and loyalties include changing patterns of 
communication and transportation associated with globalisation and the perceived 
movement towards supranational and subnational collectivities identified across 
nation-states.1  Clearly, globalisation is central to understanding both the processes by 
which attachments to Islam globally are established today and the networks within 
which they are expressed.  Through globalisation universal affiliations between 
Muslims and common loyalties are strengthened.  Less attention has been placed 
upon how the umma has been adapted by militant Muslims to engender trans-national 
support.  Similarly the reasons why Muslims have become attracted by this wider 
form of allegiance at the expense of localised ethnic and national identities require 
further exploration.   
 
To this end it is important to examine the factors behind the growing popularity of a 
concept that crosscuts nation-state boundaries and the failure of secular institutions in 
Muslim societies and the West to embolden particularistic, localised attachments.  
Transnational and localised processes that have contributed to the significance of 
Islam within collective identities across the generic Islamic resurgence are explored. 
This is because militant Islam emerges from within the broader growth in religiosity 
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and shares commonalities with less radical interpretations.  All the groups within 
militancy are, to varying degrees, aiming to implement an Islamic state within society 
governed by purified Islamic discourse with peoples’ primary loyalty being to Allah.  
Yet the boundaries of the ‘Islamic nation’ and the processes through which it should 
be achieved are sources of considerable disagreement.  Thus nationalist groups like 
Hamas, Kashmiri Jaish-e-Mohammed and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
seek to achieve national independence and introduce localised Islamic governments.  
By comparison, groups associated with al-Qa’ida strive to attain fundamental global 
changes.  Both national and transnational groups within militant Islam are explored 
here to attain a greater understanding of both collective identities that are part of their 
appeal and the processes that contribute towards their formation.  Adopting 
McCrone’s (1998) view that studies of nationalism (and by extension 
transnationalism) need, wherever possible, to bridge the structure/agency dichotomy, 
this chapter seeks to identify both relevant global and national events and processes 
and to analyse individual militant perceptions and group discourse.  By using 
individual explanations and biographical accounts to supplement structural analysis, a 
more composite picture should emerge about the interaction between global and local 
processes and their impact upon collective identities.  Finally, the significance of the 
fractures within militancy is explored and it is argued that despite al-Qa’ida’s 
emphasis upon trans-nationalism, national loyalties remain that influence the 
behaviour and interests of members.  A useful starting point is the sociology of 
nationalism which has, however, tended to neglect the significance of religion within 
nationalist movements. 
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The Sociology of Nationalism  
 
The impact of the sociology of nationalism has tended to follow political 
developments and perceptions.  During the discipline’s early development, 
nationalism was rarely accorded significance.  Among the founding fathers only 
Weber acknowledged the importance of a ‘community of sentiment,’ albeit viewed 
un-problematically.  By comparison, Marx and Engels were dismissive of nationalism 
as a capitalist ideological tool.  Indeed the persistence of national identity has 
continued to be problematic for Marxists, who have associated such particularistic 
allegiances with the development of industrial capitalism.  Consequently these forms 
of collective loyalties would dissolve within broader processes of historical 
transformation.  Durkheim was also opposed to nationalism for very different reasons.  
Perturbed by events in French society, he denounced it as ‘an extreme and morbid 
form of patriotism.’ 2   Social scientists did not become fully interested in the 
potentialities and consequences of nationalisms until the latter part of the twentieth 
century.  It was not until the 1980s that the sociology of nationalism attained 
prominence through the debate about the nature of nations and nationalism and the 
extent to which these are products of modernity.  The sub discipline was given further 
legitimacy following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new forms of 
nationalism and nations, highlighted most dramatically by the break up of Yugoslavia, 
the emergence of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian violence, ethnic genocide in Rwanda 
and ongoing conflict between Palestinians and Israel.  And despite the emergence of 
supranational collectivities like the European Union, national identities remain 
prominent and the nation remains a primary source of allegiance.   
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Throughout this period, nationalism and nations have been widely viewed as a 
Western construct.  Kedourie (1960: 9) exemplifies the Eurocentric approach, arguing 
that ‘nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century,’ although there are arguments that the concept emerged much earlier.3  And 
as with much development, Western processes have been taken as the templates with 
which to compare other parts of the world.  As Kohn (1944) noted, liberal nationalism 
was associated with democracy, civic rights and universalism and was considered to 
be typical of the West where the cultural nation was seen to coincide with the state’s 
political territory.  By comparison, illiberal nationalism was found in the East and 
was particularistic and ethnic, based in part around conflict over the state boundaries 
that did not accord with cultural perceptions.  
 
Arguably, the focus upon secular political ideologies and movements, the ongoing 
prominence of the secularisation thesis within sociology and reluctance to apply 
concepts and theories across sub disciplines has contributed to the significance of 
religion being relatively neglected within studies of nationalism. 4   While both 
Anderson and Gellner acknowledge that religious symbolism and liturgy are retained, 
religion is portrayed as a traditional social resource that was believed to have been 
lost in the ‘progressive’ transition of societies.  By comparison, nationalism is aligned 
with modernity.  Yet extensive interrelationships exist between religion, ethnicity and 
nationalism, most notably within recent conflicts in the Palestinian territories, Sri 
Lanka, former Yugoslavia, Kashmir and the partition of India. Equally similarities 
between the forms of discourse are neglected.  As Kinnvall (2002) and Rieffer (2003) 
point out, religion, like nationalism, provides a sense of security, universalism, unity, 
symbolism and explanatory discourse and is based on the notion of an imagined 
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community.  Both often involve the construction of the ‘other’.  Turner (2001: 135), 
when analysing the rise of citizenship identities, observed that ‘nationalism required 
negative images of outsiders, and as a result modern politics became a politics of 
friend or foe.’  He points out that nation-building ideology usually assumed a 
religious character.  Kedourie (1971) also explores the interrelationship between 
religion and nationalism, identifying nationalist leaders who aroused emotive support 
from the populace in part by associating their slogans, actions and symbolism with 
religious prophets like Jesus, Moses and Muhammed.  Significant religious dates 
were adopted for national festivals.  The intertwining of religions like Islam, Judaism, 
Sikhism and Hinduism within collective senses of identity, nation-states, national and 
international movements suggest that the exploration of nationalism needs to be more 
inclusive.  Consequently while this chapter primarily aims to utilise the sociology of 
nationalism to enhance levels of understanding about militant Islam, it is also hoped 
to contribute to the extension of the subject matter incorporated within the sub 
discipline.   
 
Origins of Nations 
 
Within the sociology of nationalism, considerable attention has been placed upon the 
origins of nations and the central dichotomy between primordialist and modernist 
approaches.  These different perspectives influence the definitions that are developed 
and applied for ideological concepts like nationalism, and associated terms like nation, 
that often refer to geographical boundaries that overlap with the state.  For example, 
Anderson (2006: 6), who is viewed as a leading modernist, considers the nation to be 
‘an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and 
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sovereign.’  The numerical scale of the nation means, he suggests, that individuals 
can never personally know all other members and must imagine the wider community 
and social interconnections that attach them to the national entity.  In this sense, 
individuals imagine themselves to be part of a wider entity, the nation.  This 
connection is incorporated within a sense of identity, a personal characteristic that 
incorporates cultural and national identity and as such is the basis for allegiance 
within the nation.    
 
For Anderson, nations are a modern construction.  He traces the emergence of the 
nation, and by extension nationalism, to the formation of nation-states based upon 
secular rationality associated with the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and 
industrialisation.  For this to happen, hierarchical dynasties and the ‘divine right of 
kings’ to rule as direct intermediaries and representatives of deities had to be 
challenged and ultimately rejected.  However, the removal of rulers’ infallibility, 
divinity and the usage of sacred texts and languages that gained the support and 
submission of the populace had to be replaced.  And in a manner associated with 
Tönnies’ (1887) Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, a shift occurred that replaced 
communities based around blood and localised territory with associational ties 
between individuals; in the context of the nation, then larger swathes of territory 
could be added.  In other words, if unity was to be developed and maintained within 
the national boundaries, a new form of consciousness had to be nurtured.   
 
The development of Western societies and subsequently other nation-states 5  is 
associated with industrial modernisation and the associated processes of technological 
advancement, growth of commerce, urbanisation, rapid expansion of bureaucracy, the 
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division of labour and increased literacy.  National consciousness was, Anderson 
(1991) argues, heavily influenced by the emergence of what he refers to as ‘print 
capitalism’ and which connected to the growing rates of literacy through expanded 
educational programmes.  Developments in printing and transportation considerably 
improved the availability of information and destroyed the monopoly of the written 
word held by the anciens regime.  Books, novels and newspapers were published and 
raised awareness about senses of time and space in which readers were located.  Such 
forms of media also provided the mechanisms to challenge perceptions of divinity 
and fatalism through growing confidence in scientific discovery and methodology.  
And through the formation of a popular language, print capitalism was able to provide 
common narrative for the populace, helping to engender national consciousness 
which provided the basis for shared institutions and laws.  Similar processes are 
identified in other parts of the world.  Van der Veer (1994) examines the role of print, 
radio, television and film within nationalism in colonial and postcolonial India.  
However, instead of eroding the sacred languages and associated communities, as 
Anderson claimed, at least some of these languages were reinforced with Hindi and 
Urdu becoming increasingly significant for Hindus and Muslims respectively.  
Equally Arabic has grown in importance across the world through similar processes.  
 
For the potentialities of print capitalism to be maximised, large numbers of the 
population would have to be capable of reading the new materials.  This was achieved 
through the widespread introduction of schools, curricula and other forms of 
socialisation that emphasised components central to the ‘diffusion of a state ideology 
of national identity’ (Halliday 2000: 115).  The development of an educated populace 
also had unintentional consequences.  Gellner (1983) argues that most susceptible to 
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the lure of nationalism were the educated and relatively economically privileged who 
felt politically under represented.  Rarely were the poor identified as its cornerstone.  
And as the following sections indicate, a range of Islamic nationalisms emerged in 
reaction to colonialism, across a broad spectrum of the population, both educated and 
unschooled.  But in the following chapter it is argued that the tremendous increase in 
Islam within education has contributed to contemporary militant collective 
consciousness.  
 
From these modern origins, people shared a sense of belonging that was solidified 
through the printed history of the nation; they were connected to this civic model of 
the nation through the past and in the present, even though much of the former was 
not factually correct.  Halliday (2000: 7) suggests that,  
 
the pretense of both nationalism and religion is that they represent a true 
reading of a given, the past or the doctrine; the reality is that different 
groups, in power or out of it, in the region or in exile, constantly redefine 
and reselect to serve contemporary purposes.  
 
History is important, as primordialists argue below, but Halliday (2000) asserted that 
there is no continuity with pre-modernity.  Instead symbols and narratives from the 
past are selected, reformulated and fabricated.  National consciousness therefore 
emerged as individuals imagined that they belonged within discrete parameters, 
shared with the living and dead.  Adopting a teleological position, Anderson argues 
that nations can only be formed when humans have the ability and means for 
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construction and as these only existed within modernity, nationalism can only be a 
modern phenomenon. 
 
Pre-modern roots 
 
By comparison to the modernist approach, primordialists, which arose with the work 
of Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963), argue that although nations may appear to be a 
modern construction, they ‘may have pre modern precursors and can form around 
recurrent ethnic antecedents’ (Smith 1999: 11).  Consequently the nation should not 
be reduced to modernity but instead can be traced to the pre modern era and the 
cultural realm.  Smith, while critical of both approaches, has been associated with 
primordialists and certainly provides illuminating explorations of pre modernisation.  
However, he also recognises the importance of processes associated with modernity 
and provides a broader definition of a nation that reflects this.  For Smith, a nation is 
(1991: 14) ‘a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths 
and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common 
legal rights and duties for all members’.  Nationalism is ‘an ideological movement for 
the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a 
population some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential 
“nation”’ (Smith 2003: 24).  These definitions seek to incorporate the interplay 
between the past and present as well as Smith’s belief that nations are historical 
products that orientate around shared descent and ancestry.  He argues that ‘no 
enduring world order can be created that ignores the ubiquitous yearnings of nations 
in search of roots in an ethnic past, and no study of nations and nationalism that 
completely ignores the past can bear fruit’ (1986: 5).  And while he acknowledges 
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that the languages used to describe nations may be products of modernity, this did not 
prevent ethnic communities with collective identities from forming, embedded within 
and transmitted across generations of, popular culture.  Actions, beliefs and affective 
emotions are integral to understanding the long term processes rather than over-
concentrating on the actions of the elite, an approach associated with the modernists.  
Certainly nations are imagined but must also be willed and felt.  Imagination alone 
cannot explain, Smith (2003: 22) argues, the ‘exercise of collective will and the 
arousal of mass emotion.’  Within this perception, the ‘ethnie’, or ethnic community, 
is integral, providing a sense of solidarity that is connected to a shared culture that 
includes myths, traditions and historical memories and links with territory.  For Smith, 
this highlights that collective consciousness and loyalties to larger units predate 
modernity.   
 
Guibernau (2004) argues that Smith’s account places inadequate attention upon the 
role of the nation-state and consequently is unable to explain nationalism in the 
twenty-first century.  History, it is argued, cannot explain the present.  What people or 
movements ‘do in the present is dictated by present concerns, and the past is the 
source from which legitimation, justification and inspiring examples can all be 
drawn’ (Halliday 2000: 38).  Halliday (2000) is also critical of primordialists, and by 
extension, elements of Smith’s work; namely while cultures and social allegiances 
existed prior to industrialisation, this does not mean they were nations as they are 
understood today.  Smith is also criticised for overestimating the robustness of 
nationalism and placing insufficient attention upon the Enlightenment culture 
(Llobera 1994).   
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However, while Smith identifies the legacy of pre modernity in modern national 
consciousness he also acknowledges the contributions of processes engrained within 
modernity and identifies two methods through which nation-states formed.  Within 
what he describes as ‘the lateral route’, aristocracies associated with West Europe and 
the newly formed centralised states incorporated the frequently disparate populace 
and regions through bureaucratic processes.  By utilising the judiciary, military and 
administrative systems a composite community was formed based upon cultural 
traditions and ethnic norms and values that formed civic or state nationalism.  As 
Hutchinson and Smith (1994) point out, this required an intermingling between the 
peoples and a subsequent broadening of cultural identity.  Alternatively nations 
emerged as part of a challenge to the established foreign, namely colonial, rulers 
through a vertical route.  Demotic ethnies who shared religious values and traditions 
were mobilised by educator-intellectuals and emphasis shifted from looking 
backwards and inwards to activist opposition demanding liberation.  For Smith (1991: 
64), intellectuals were able to politicise the ethnies through vernacular mobilisation 
that drew upon historical traditions and ‘the poetic space and golden ages of the 
communal past’ within ethnic nationalism.  By emphasising components of history 
that individuals and groups shared, common support was mobilised in defence of a 
cultural legacy, national characteristics and associated territory.  For many Muslim 
militants, the golden age of the communal past stems from the time of Muhammed 
and the formation of the umma.   
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Religious Nationalism 
  
The concept of religious nationalism is defined as ‘a community of religious people 
or the political movement of a group of people heavily influenced by religious beliefs 
who aspire to be politically self-determining’ (Rieffer 2003: 225).  Religious beliefs, 
ideas and symbols are integral to the movement and are often closely connected to 
attempts to enhance levels of religiosity within communities.  Despite the widespread 
belief that nationalism had replaced religion, as the above examples indicate, 
religious influence and loyalties have continued to permeate throughout nations and 
indeed have become the most prominent form of collective identification.  Conversely, 
secular nationalisms often reject many central religious tenets and practices.  But, as 
Smith (2003: 17-8) comments, if examined beneath official discourse, the nation 
binds its members through selective ritual and symbolic practices and mythologies 
that stem from deeper cultural resources and sacred foundations that connect both to 
‘chosen’ people and holy land through memories, sacrifices and memorials.  Thus 
when seeking to explain the durability and strength of national identities, Smith 
(2003: 77) focused upon nations’ collective beliefs and sentiments and their 
relationship with older beliefs, symbols and traditions associated with religions.  
Myths associated with religion have a ‘capacity for mobilizing and motivating 
communities and states, and underpinning a sense of national identity through a 
sacred communion of the elect.’  Using the example of Zionism, but which could also 
be applied to other religious nationalisms, Smith (2003) argues that the connection 
with the past and ethnic election is essential to understanding the mobilization of 
Jewish people and the aim to return to spiritual roots.  And within nation-states, 
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religious cultural resources and sacred foundations have been entwined with 
contemporary ethnicity.   
 
However the tendency to over-concentrate on Western processes and crude division 
between East and West has resulted in analysis frequently being over-generalised and 
important trends overlooked.  Even Smith’s exploration is restricted to European 
societies, although he does express the hope that a similar analysis can be adapted to 
other religious and cultural traditions, in particular within southern and Southeast 
Asia.  In many parts of the world, religion remains embedded within the nation, 
religious activism is increasing and secularisation is less dominant than in many parts 
of the West.  For example, Chatterjee (1993) examines the struggle for national 
independence in India and argues that the movement integrated religion within 
national identity.  And van der Veer (1994) explores the programs instigated by the 
radical Hindu party, Shiv Sena, in 1993.  Religious images were utilised that had 
recently been reinforced within popular Hindu culture, for example the widely 
popular television dramatisation of Hindu stories.  In Poland, throughout communism, 
Catholicism was intertwined with national identity (Zawadzki (2005).  Anderson 
(2006) acknowledges that religions like Islam and Buddhism cover large swathes of 
territory.  But when applying the example of Islam he argues that different languages 
meant communication was impossible beyond ideographs to be located within the 
sacred classical Arabic texts, with the Qu’ran until recently untranslatable.  This made 
the communities distinct from today’s imagined communities because, Anderson 
(2006: 13) suggests, the linkage with sacred languages provided the older 
communities with greater ‘confidence in the unique sacredness of their languages, 
and thus their ideas about admission to membership’.  However, it is also important to 
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avoid over stressing the role of language which, in isolation, does not result in 
nationalism.  Indeed, as Weber (1978: 395-6) pointed out, many nation-states have 
more than one language.   
 
Although Smith concentrates on processes through which predominately western 
nation-states utilised religion, there are more explicit religious adaptations.  Zawadzki 
(2005) observes that not only do nationalist movements appropriate religion, but 
religious movements have reconstructed nationalism.  Juergensmeyer (1993) 
examines the processes through which ‘religious nationalists’ use the corruption and 
alienation associated with modern societies as factors to mobilise the ‘return’ of the 
community to righteous behaviour.  Religion is also utilised by secular nationalist 
leaders to help solidify support, strengthen collective consciousness and legitimise 
behaviour, particularly during times of crisis.  Contrary, therefore, to popular 
perceptions, religion was integral to the emergence of nationalism and remains 
influential individually, ethnically and within nation-state discourse, often providing a 
moral benchmark upon which current behaviour is measured by ‘religious 
nationalists’.   
 
It is also important to acknowledge that conflicts commonly associated with religion 
are not purely religious but also incorporate nationalist sentiments and intentions.  In 
the 1979 Iranian Revolution and aftermath, Halliday (2000) identifies a range of 
sentiments that drew upon the concept of the nation and Persian traditions.  In other 
countries like Egypt it is possible to note political leaders seeking to connect to 
Egyptian, Arab and Islamic loyalties according to the issue (Zubaida 1989).  Halliday 
(2000: 45) also points out that religious transnationalism crosscuts and predates 
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nations and from which it is distinct.  ‘All three Middle Eastern monotheistic 
religions allow for arguments that deny the legitimacy of particular states, often on 
the grounds that the establishment of such a state does not meet the ethical or 
scriptural expectations which the religion lays down’.   
 
The Rise and Fall of the ‘Islamic Nation’  
 
In a manner akin to other more ‘orthodox’ nationalists, religious groups also utilise 
the past.  Smith (2003) points out that perceptions of the past are instrumental in 
people making sense of the present and the ways in which members were bound into 
communities sharing common history that revolves around memories of battles, poets, 
heroes and heroines.  ‘Golden Ages’, when the community was powerful, prosperous 
and creative, contributing to culture, religion, moral purpose and knowledge, are 
drawn upon in the present.  This belief in the glorious past underpins the sense of 
national identity held by many, encourages virtue, provides feelings of collective 
dignity, especially in periods of oppression or division, and often inspires emulation.  
The fact, as Dieckhoff (2005) remarks, that aspirations to restore lost cultural purity 
are largely illusionary with their origins rooted in myths and cultural cross breeding 
overlooked, should not detract from the social effectiveness of invoking the ‘Golden 
Age’.  By emphasising components of history that individuals and groups share, 
common support has been mobilised in defence of a cultural legacy, national 
characteristics and associated territory.  This is clearly apparent in militant Muslims’ 
emphasis upon the exploits of Muhammed and the time of the four caliphs when 
Islam was the dominant global discourse.  During this period Muslims were believed 
to be pure, devout practitioners governed by righteous leaders through the shari’ah.  
 111
A Yemeni veteran of the Afghan conflict against the Soviet Union encapsulates these 
sentiments within religious nationalism, 
 
Afghanistan reminded Muslims of all colors and races that what unites 
us is much more important than the superficial differences wrought by 
colonialism, secular nationalism, and other material ideologies. We felt 
we were on the verge of re-enacting and reliving the Golden Age of our 
blessed ancestors.6 
 
The golden age of the communal past stems, for most Muslims, from the time of 
Muhammed and the formation of the umma.  Across denominational interpretations, 
the umma retains a significance that has arguably increased in importance.  The 
perception of this community is highly contested and has led to the umma being 
considered by Khosrokhavar (2005: 61) to be an ‘imagined community’, because 
although ‘Islamic societies exist in the real world… there is no such thing as an 
Islamic society.  Crucially for militants, the umma is achieveable and indeed 
contactable.  The leading ideologue, Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) for example, considered 
the umma to be,  
 
a collectivity of people whose entire lives – in their intellectual, social, 
existential, political, moral, and practical aspects – are based on Islamic 
ethics.  Thus characterized, this umma ceases to exist if no part of the earth 
is governed according to the law of God any longer.7   
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Drawing upon the seventh and eighth centuries when Islamic control spread beyond 
the Middle East into North Africa and Spain, Qutb argued that the Islamic community 
could only be restored through the leadership of a vanguard of the umma.  
Throughout this period and beyond, the religion continued to spread and Islam 
became both politically and numerically dominant in many areas.  Yet Lapidus 
(2002) suggests that by the eighth and ninth centuries, the caliphate was already 
evolving into a colonial and secular regime.  In the new era, which Lapidus dates 
between 950 and 1200AD, Islam went from defining the political elite to expressing 
‘the communal identity of the masses of Middle Eastern people’ (ibid.).  
Consequently the religious and ethnic characteristics of the region that are commonly 
associated with the emergence of the religion developed over 600 years and have 
continued to evolve.  Since the emergence of the umma under Muhammed’s 
leadership and the onset of the Muslim conquests, followers have belonged to a 
multitude of communal groups and loyalties.  Their roots stem from family, tribal and 
ethnic ties, rural and urban societies and preceding civilizations, religions and 
paganism that were dominant prior to the emergence of Islam.  In other words, like 
other forms of collective allegiances, ‘Islamic identity’ has always been 
heterogeneous, interwoven with local influences like ethnicity, culture, gender and 
socio-economics.   
 
Islam within the Middle East, and the religion more generally, became influential in 
other parts of the world but again important vicissitudes can be noticed.  The military 
conquest of the Indian subcontinent began in the eight century and Islamic regimes 
became dominant in the region by the end of the twelfth century.  Sub-Saharan Africa 
encountered Islam through a range of trading and teaching networks and processes of 
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migration.  The spread of Islam slowly permeated southwards.  Muslim communities 
developed in parts of Somalia and Ethiopia from the ninth century and had become 
integral in parts of Sudanese towns by the twelfth century but did not become 
influential in the Ivory Coast and Guinea until the nineteenth century.  After 
Southeast Asia first encountered Islam in the seventh century, the religion was not 
established until between the thirteenth and fifteen centuries in a similar manner to 
sub-Saharan Africa (Rubenstein 2002).  People were often introduced to Islam 
through Sufis, commercial activities and the conversion of leaders for realpolitik 
purposes but not through military conquest.  China provides an example of the 
introduction of Islam being both violent and peaceful (Braudel 1993, Esposito 1999).  
From the seventh century, the religion was encountered through the ‘Silk Road’ trade 
and militarily through Turkic and Arab invaders.  In these different contexts Islam 
was localised.  For example, the conversion of leaders and their maintenance of 
power resulted in the continuity of pre-Islamic values and practices in Southeast Asia.  
Similar processes can be noticed in the latter conversion of the Muslims of central 
Asia, where large-scale conversion among many groups like the Kazakhs did not 
occur until the eighteenth century (Lapidus 2002).  In neighbouring Dagestan, 
however, Islam was introduced in the seventh century and had spread across the 
region by the sixteenth century (Roschin 2006).   
 
The emergence of the majority of today’s recognisable Muslim nation-states 
generally commenced throughout the first half of the twentieth century.  Legitimation 
for the formation and continuation of separate defined Muslim territories for 
moderate Muslims, in particular, can be found in the break-up of the early Caliphate.  
Certainly today an examination of Islam and associated frontiers details a lack of a 
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generic transnational approach.  Instead some countries like Turkey and Tunisia 
subordinate religion to state control; although the balance is slowly shifting, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Mauritania promote what Lapidus (2002: 837) refers to as ‘Islamo-
nationalist identity’ and Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan have all 
declared themselves Islamic states over recent years.  There is therefore a strong 
argument that connects identity formation with ideological dominance within 
communities and defined territories.  A central component, a point echoed by both 
militants and to a lesser extent Western academics like van der Veer (1994), is that 
colonialism has been instrumental in the formation of modern nationalism in Muslim 
societies. 
 
Impact of Colonialism 
 
Today, nationalism is largely opposed and viewed by transnational militants as either 
a western imposition or the outcome of struggles for independence against 
colonialism.  In some respects, there is historical evidence that supports this 
perspective.  Habeck (2006: 101) reports on the view that nationalism was introduced 
to weaken the Muslim community by splitting it into racial and ethnic groups.  
Concepts like ‘integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’ ‘are specifically designed to reduce 
a Muslim’s attachment to the community and Islamic ideals, while convincing 
Muslims that other religions and cultures are the equal of Islam.’  Yet at the same 
time, colonialists were promoting more moderate forms of Islam and collaborated 
with religious leaders who defended the regimes and even helped recruit military 
support.   
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European domination was frequently associated with conflict as local ethnic Muslim 
groups fought against the colonial invaders.  For example, across East and West 
Africa, the Madhists in Nigeria, Tuaregs in Niger and Sufis in Mauritania and 
Somalia fought prolonged struggles.  Ultimately however, foreign domination was 
generally enforced.  In Turkestan, opposition to Russian control also included militant 
Muslims, most notably Muhammad al-Khailifa Kabir (1856-98) who led a short-lived 
campaign.  The impact of the jihad spread to neighbouring regions until they were 
finally defeated.  More substantive challenges were noticeable in the aftermath of the 
1917 Russian Revolution when, during the fighting between Russian Reds and 
Whites, Muslims in Azerbaijan, the Caucasus and Kazakhstan sought independence. 
Finally in Indonesia, the first nationalist mass movement, Sarekat Islam, was formed 
in 1912 and quickly split under the pressures of internal conflicts.  Two groups 
emerged out of the religious anti-colonial struggle, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama, that were to remain influential long after independence had been attained 
(Cederroth 1996).  During the 1920s, nationalist and Islamic groups developed 
political and cultural networks that cut across regional, ethnic and discursive 
differences to achieve a common challenge to the Dutch colonialists.   
 
For transnational militants, the influence of the Indian born Sayyid Abul Al-Mawdudi 
within the challenge to British colonial control of India is embedded within 
perspectives of nationalism.  Al-Mawdudi opposed the formation of the Pakistani 
nation-state, arguing that nationalism implied the sovereignty of the people.  By 
comparison the true Islamic state was founded on the principle that sovereignty 
belongs to God.  He therefore considered nationalism to be a process through which 
ignorance (jahiliyya) was instilled in the populace.  Ayman al-Zawahiri 8 , when 
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arguing that the establishment of a global caliphate was the duty of all Muslims, 
stated ‘we do not recognize Sykes-Picot [the 1916 agreement that resulted in the 
division of the Middle East].’  Kepel (2005) reports on the comments of the Jama’at 
Islamiyya member, Isam al-Din al’Aryan, who declared that nationalism in post-
independent Egypt was simply a new form of westernisation.  But as Pappé (2005) 
notes, nationalism is now an integral component of non western societies, albeit 
increasingly interwoven with religion.  At the level of Muslim nation-states, Halliday 
(2000:130) explains that while they may be involved both in rhetorical threats to the 
West and individual acts or strategies, ‘Muslim states are incapable of mounting a 
concerted challenge, let alone of redrawing boundaries.’  Arguably, the strategic 
weakness of Muslim nation-states is fuelling trans-nationalism and asymmetrical 
conflict by other forces operating outside government control.   
 
The militant critical dismissal of nationalism also overlooks the manner in which 
religion was intertwined within opposition to colonialism and provided a unifying 
discourse for otherwise disparate groups to enable popular mobilisation.  The 
strengthening of national identities was often invigorated by the formal division by 
the colonisers of the indigenous populations into religious groups, like the Hindus and 
Muslims, and Buddhists and Hindus, in India and Sri Lanka respectively.  For 
example, in response to British rule, Shah ‘Abd al-Aziz declared a fatwa in 1803, 
demanding that Indian Muslims fight against the colonialists in Holy War.9  In the 
Senegambian region of Africa, the jihad led by a Qu’ran teacher, Ma Ba (1809-67) 
sought to achieve independence while attacking indigenous enemies and perceived 
pagans and seeking to conquer other areas and peoples.  ‘Throughout West Africa 
Islam had come to be the almost universal language of political ambition and moral 
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reform… . In many cases Islam provided for the unification of heterogeneous peoples 
and the creation of states.’10   
 
Rise of State Nationalism and Decline of Religious Influence 
 
For modernists like Ernest Gellner (1978), nationalism strongly correlates with 
nation-states.  It is the ideological cement that connects people to the nation-state and 
civil society and protects state culture.  In this sense, Gellner has been criticised for 
his assumption that nationalism as a challenging discourse is over.  Nations became 
embedded within West European territories and competition between them for 
influence and resources led to the pursuit of land to colonise a variety of ethnic 
groups, which were divided and controlled through the establishment of maps and 
boundaries.  Post World War II, Anderson (2006) argues that the ‘last wave’ of 
nationalisms possess their own characteristics but these can only be understood in 
terms of the success of Western nations.  While modernists have examined the impact 
of colonialism, Chatterjee (1993) suggests that Anderson in particular over-
concentrated on processes within the West and failed to fully identify the role of 
colonialism.  The imposition of foreign governments made a huge contribution to the 
emergence of nationalism within the colonial territories that sought independence.  
For example, Anderson (2006) dates the emergence of nationalism in Malaysia and 
Indonesia, when both were subjected to colonial rule, to be 1938 and 1928 
respectively.  In the latter example, Anderson explores the formation of nationalism 
across a large population that was fragmented across some 3,000 islands and 
numerous religious allegiances and ethno-linguistic diversity.  The establishment of 
government schools, he suggests (ibid.: 121), and ‘uniform textbooks, standardised 
 118
diplomas and teaching certificates, a strictly regulated gradation of age groups, 
classes and instructional materials, in themselves created a self-contained, coherent 
universe of experience.’  Anderson tended to concentrate upon these policies as an 
extension of dynastic governments, a point he acknowledged in the 2006 edition of 
Imagined Communities.  In this edition, he added that across Southeast Asia, 
accommodation was made with different religious affiliations that had ‘served as the 
basis of very old, very stable imagined communities not in the least aligned with the 
secular state’s authoritarian grid-map’ (2006: 169).  Why these religious imagined 
communities were not considered to be nations was not explained.  Nor was the 
significance of universal processes in contributing to anti-imperialist movements fully 
explored.   
 
The formation of Muslim nation-states is also contentious.  Milton-Edwards (2005: 
73) comments that in many instances,  
 
new nations and new peoples who were subject to statehood were declared 
with little evidence of consultation with the leaders of pre-existing 
religious and other communities in these areas. It was little wonder that 
the legitimacy of such states and their locally appointed leaders were 
called into question by the fundamentalists.   
 
The majority of today’s Muslim nation-states formed through independence in the 
first half of the twentieth century.  Previous local elites, family, tribal or community 
membership had to be replaced.  New allegiances were built ‘upon a fusion of 
historical lineage, ethnic, linguistic, and Islamic symbols recast in linguistic-ethnic 
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and nationalist terms.’ 11   Processes designed to achieve modernisation were 
embedded with slogans and symbols designed to appeal to a common collectivity.  
Gershoni and Jankowski (1987) detail the long standing attempts within Egypt to 
introduce a well developed pre-Islamic history that stressed distinction and separation.  
In Turkey, Atatürk initiated a similar scheme with a fictitious Turkic past which 
became a template for adaptation by many modernising Muslim governments.  A 
process adopted across the Arab region.  Iran also emphasised a pre-Islamic past that 
identified unique national characteristics.  Arab nationalists reciprocated and a 
process evolved that contributed to wider cultural and political divides.  In Egypt, 
nationalists failed to embed the Pharaohic past within twentieth century nationalism 
because there was a distinct lack of continuity across language, symbols and culture.  
Across Muslim societies, these attempts at ‘imagined pasts’ were only partially 
successful. 
 
This can be partly attributed to the interrelated processes of secularisation and 
modernisation that have been adopted across Muslim societies and, as the following 
chapter details, have only been partially successful.  Education has been central 
within attempts at modernisation and the strengthening of national consciousness 
across Muslim societies.  In the following chapter, the impact of educational schemes 
is examined in more detail.  It is important here to note that the role of schooling upon 
national consciousness is mixed, with education paradoxically instrumental both in 
the formation of secular and Islamo nationalism.   
 
At a structural level, nationalism is present within Muslim cultural, political and 
economic institutions in a ‘top-down’ approach.  But McCrone (1998: 40) suggests, 
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‘the everyday affirmation of national identity is an active process, reinforced by the 
banal symbolism of national identity.’  The successful transmission and acceptance of 
nationalism is therefore dependent upon people identifying with both the discourse 
and ‘imagined’ community.  In turn it could be argued this identification feeds into 
broader social processes and the reproduction of historical memory.  Within many 
Muslim societies, these processes have failed to overcome the imposed origins of the 
nation-states that did not connect to popular sentiments and attachments.  And, 
national governments have failed to integrate their ‘top down’ approach within civil 
society, with many people disengaged or disillusioned with the failure of nationalist 
discourse to deliver promises.  Equally, other broader social identifications like Arab 
nationalism have also been seriously undermined through association with failure, 
most notably defeat for a coalition of Arab nation-states in the 1967 war against Israel.   
 
National and Transnational Identity 
 
Despite considerable efforts to embed nationalist loyalties within territories, identities 
remain diverse.  This is not unusual.  McCrone (1998: 183) suggests that ‘the power 
of nationalism in the modern world lies in its capacity to reconfigure personal 
identities and loyalties in a way more in tune with the social, cultural and political 
realities… .’  But this is not to state that nationalism is inevitably the paramount form 
of identity.  Instead McCrone acknowledges that nationalism may not have priority 
over multiple identities, other forms of social identity like socio-economic class or 
gender.  Today, other economic, political and cultural forces have eroded the 
universalism of the nation-state for many.  Interpretations of the nation, what it means, 
the boundaries and the selective use of history are, as Halliday (2000) points out, 
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contingent and ever changing.  The internalisation of nationalism and level of 
accordance will therefore depend on the extent to which it accords with individual 
identity and other collective consciousnesses in rapidly transforming contexts.  In this 
sense, national identity is not fixed and immutable but, like identity more generally, 
‘always in process’ (McCrone 1998: 138).  Again, the interaction between discourse 
and identity is an inherent feature of the internalisation of religious values generally 
and militancy in particular.  Islamic movements are therefore subverting ‘the 
principle of not only the nation-state, but also, possibly, of nationalism’ as Dieckhoff 
and Jaffrelot (2005: 266) argue.  Instead, Islamic militants are promoting a form of 
nationalism that challenges the dominance of western forms of nationalism.   
 
Alongside geographical boundaries, the globalisation related transformation of media, 
communications, transportation and migration have contributed to new forms of 
identity that transcend national, racial, ethnic and socio-economic barriers.  Factors 
identified by van der Veer (1994) in the mobilisation of religious nationalism among 
Hindus and Muslims in India, like religious travel, pilgrimage and migration, became 
accelerated through global processes.  There has been a proliferation of transnational 
and global Muslim movements that include ‘such diverse groups as publication and 
propaganda organizations, missionary (da’wa) societies, Sufi brotherhoods, banks, 
youth associations, emigrant communities with international ties and others (Lapidus 
2002: 868).  However, despite the greater interlocking between Muslims, and shared 
experiences, there is little evidence to support Lapidus’ (ibid) claim that there is a 
‘universalistic identity.’  This overlooks the tremendous variations within identity 
formations, beliefs and other cross cutting loyalties.  Lapidus does acknowledge that 
there are other forms of loyalty that root people within particular communities.  And 
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certainly there are some similar practices and beliefs, but the variations of 
implementation, behaviour and accommodation with political discourse result in 
religion varying from being a small component on which to base individual identity 
to an all-encompassing framework.  Prior to the latest burst of globalisation, Milton-
Edwards (2005: 29) observed that ‘pre-fundamentalists’ like al-Afghani, Abduh, 
Sayyid Khan and Rashid Rida responded to fears of foreign domination and the need 
for enhanced religiosity and utilised ‘technological development in communications, 
travel and culture to get their message across to a wider audience.’  In some respects, 
the ‘pre-fundamentalists’ provided an early template for later generations to adapt.  
 
Militant Islamic Nationalism 
 
Although ethnic identities remain important in localised conditions for groups like 
Kurds, Berbers and Chechens, Lapidus (2002) outlines how many people within other 
ethnicities like Indonesians, Malaysians, Bangladeshis, Turks and Algerians now 
place greater emphasis on religion as their primary source of collective identity.  This 
process is being aided by encroaching religious influence within government relations, 
ranging from the introduction of the shari’ah in Mauritania and in several Nigerian 
federal states to the incorporation of Islamic parties within political processes across 
the Middle East, North and East Africa, South and South East Asia.  For example, 
Sudan is divided according to geography, religion and ethnicity with Northern 
territories populated by Arabic speaking Muslims and the south controlled by non-
Muslim Africans.  Lapidus (2002: 781) suggests that in Africa it is only where 
substantial numbers of Muslims claim Arab descent that ‘national identity is 
expressed in Islamic terms.’ ‘Despite their claim to be supranational, most Islamist 
 123
movements have been shaped by national particularities.  Sooner or later they tend to 
express national interests, even under the pretext of Islamist ideology’ (Roy 2004: 62).  
Similarly processes of rising Islamic nationalism are identified by Schwartz (2005 
TM 21/10/5) who points out that extremists in the northern Muslim states of Nigeria 
want to install the shari’ah but as the form of government within a separatist state.   
 
The struggle for national independence is noticeable in places like the Palestinian 
territories, Chechnya, Philippines, Thailand and Kashmir where large numbers of 
Sunni Muslims feel they are being suppressed.  Militant groups operate in these 
identifiable boundaries like Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front.  All these groups have specific objectives orientated around the 
attainment of independence and/or an Islamic nation-state within a localised 
geographical region.  Seesemann (2006) notes that Islamic groups, like these, are 
focused on internal social and political transformation; the global umma is 
subordinate within their priorities.   
 
In other regions, religious nationalism has become noticeable in different 
circumstances. Unlike many post independent regimes that initially relegated the role 
of religion, the demise of the Soviet Union was accompanied by a noticeable rise in 
religious fervour across the Islamic spectrum, from moderation to militancy.  The 
demand for an Islamic state within Kazakhstan, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan has been noticeable from the point at which Soviet repression was lifted.  
For millions of Central Asians the demise of the Soviet Union provided them with 
greater freedom to develop and express different forms of collective identities and 
explore ethnic and internal and international religious associations that had been 
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suppressed following the communist revolution and the subsequent division of the 
territory into socialist republics (Rashid 2002).  Islamic awareness was aided with the 
arrival of Islamic educators, advisors and funding for mosques and Qu’ranic 
translations.  Religious nationalism therefore increased markedly in these regions and 
transnational fighters are known to have located to the region (Rashid 2002).  Yet 
there is little evidence to suggest any significant contributions from central Asian 
Muslims outside the region.   
 
Perceptions about, and the attempts to mobilise on behalf of, and defend, the umma 
therefore vary between and within groups.  Transnationalists refer to religious 
obligations to defend Muslims across the world and to implement international 
change.  Militants operating within national contexts will focus upon mobilising a 
localised umma while seeking to utilise the globalised neo-umma to attract wider 
support.  Hamas’ (1988) Covenant provides illuminating examples of a localised 
group that utilises the global umma.  Reference is made to the Islamic world being on 
fire, fighters who ‘have sacrificed their lives on the soil of Palestine,’ to support from 
the ‘vast Arab and Islamic world’ with the liberation ‘bound to three circles: the 
Palestinian circle, the Arab circle and the Islamic circle’ and the duty of every 
Muslim wherever they maybe.   The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) is 
described as ‘a distinguished Palestinian movement whose allegiance is to Allah, and 
whose way of life is Islam.  It strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of 
Palestine’ which has been consecrated by Muslims ‘till the Day of Judgement.’  
‘Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of 
the religious creed.  Nothing in nationalism is more significant or deeper than in the 
case when an enemy should tread Moslem land.’   
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Many other less well-publicised nationalist groups adopt similar tactics.  For example, 
foreign intervention, mutual misgivings and mistrust between Hindus and Muslims in 
Kashmir have led to both groups increasingly considering the ‘other’ as a growing 
threat.  The perceived lack of integration into the Indian nation-state has contributed 
to Kashmiri identity steadily becoming synonymous with Kashmiri Muslim identity 
(Blom 2007, Rao 1999).  Inequality, repression and feelings of injustice have 
Islamised Muslim national identity while contributing to the Hinduisation of the 
Kashmiri conflict for Hindus.  James and Özdamar (2005) point out with respect to 
Kashmir, and which can be applied to other nationalist conflicts, that the rise in 
Islamic identity causes tensions between different interpretations within communities 
and solidifies perceptions of difference between Kashmiri Muslims and Indian 
Hindus and in the process reinforces ethnic antagonisms.  Similar, if more 
complicated yet condensed processes can be observed in the spiralling of violence 
between orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians.  Despite long 
standing historical grievances and ethnic disputes, the Tito government had been able 
to enforce security and some cohesion through federalism.  However after the death 
of Tito in 1980 and rising economic and political insecurities, ethnic solidarities 
fractured and old disputes were inflamed by political nationalists.  Religion became 
the most immediate method of identifying and ultimately attacking the ‘other’.  In 
turn attacks and threats of attack strengthened group loyalties around the social 
identity they held in common and which was ironically being used as the grounds for 
their ‘otherness’ (Iveković 2002, Milton-Edwards 2005).  In other words this multiple 
reciprocal process quickly spiralled into greater religiosity and violence.  For the 
Bosnian Muslims, this meant that their previously secular beliefs were replaced by 
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religion and Islam became more dominant during the conflict.  However as Berger 
(1999) points out this did not mean that the conflict was inspired by religion.  Instead 
religion became a source of identification and in some instances a source of 
justification for actions.  The involvement of religion in the conflict is further 
complicated by the participation of transnational Muslims.  For the wider militant 
movement, Bosnia became symbolic of Western inaction and indifference to Muslim 
deaths.  However many foreign fighters were dismayed by what they considered to be 
the lax practice of the Bosnians.  And following the creation of the Bosnian nation-
state in the mid 1990s, Islam has gradually diminished in significance with politics 
dominated by secular parties.   
 
A different example of the relationship between national and transnational militancy 
can be found within another underreported example of Islamic militancy in Libya 
where the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) seeks to overthrow the Qadhafi 
regime.  This is in order ‘to save the Libyan Muslims from the oppression, tyranny 
and even more importantly, from the deviation of Qadhafi from true Islam’.12  LIFG 
also attempts to mobilise support for the conflict amongst Muslims within Libya and 
across Muslim societies and incorporates theological influences from global figures 
like Qutb, Azzam, al-Shankiti and al-Uthaymin with local martyrs like Omar al-
Mukhtar who was hanged by the Italians (Terdman 2005).  But within Libyan 
militancy, there are also Muslims who advocate a duty to other jihadis and conflicts, 
witnessed by the discovery that some Libyan nationals had been arrested or killed 
fighting in Iraq.13   
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The break-up of the former Soviet Union has also contributed to the resurgence of 
Islam generally and greater integration between religion and nationalism. Mili (2005) 
and Wang (2003) argue that this impact has permeated outwards to neighbouring 
states and has influenced Muslim sentiments amongst the Uygurs who comprise more 
than seven million of the Xinjiang region of China’s seventeen million population 
(Rubenstein 2002).  Changes in neighbouring countries, involvement of some Uygurs 
in the fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the relaxation of transport 
restraints contributed to enhanced links with surrounding Muslims and greater 
religious awareness.  Alongside these factors, long standing economic failure and 
corruption resulted in growing demands for Islamic political involvement, which have 
developed into demands for independence and the imposition of the shari’ah.  The 
East Turkistan Islamic Movement has used terror tactics to try to achieve this.  In the 
North Caucasus, after becoming riddled with ethnic divisions, the Pan-Caucasus 
movement failed to attain independence and the Confederation of the Peoples of the 
North Caucasus (KNK) became more explicitly Islamic, aiming to unite around 
religion and install an independent Islamic state in Chechnya.  At the time one of the 
leaders, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, declared that ‘all the Moslem countries should 
participate in the Chechen jihad, providing it with both military and humanitarian 
support’. 14   The participation of Arab mujahideen within the Chechen conflict 
indicates a transnational component.  Until his death in 2002, the Saudi Emir Khattab 
sought an Islamic state in the North Caucasus.  Islamic government in Chechnya was 
to be the first stage in the process of regional development.  Consequently conflict in 
Chechnya was a means to a broader ends but as Tumelty (2006) points out, the focus 
remained regional with the American ‘far enemy’ not featuring in military or even 
rhetorical attacks.  Following the succession to leadership of Abu Walid and then Abu 
 128
Hafs al-Urdani this changed and attacks against the United States were advocated.  
Yet the conflict in Chechnya also includes Chechen religious nationalists who may 
fight alongside the transnationalists for shared outcomes, blurring distinctions 
between groups.  But many Chechens led by Shamil Basayev, are ultimately fighting 
for self-determination 15  and can be considered to be part of the evolution from 
nationalism to Islamic nationalism with roots in the nineteenth century struggles 
against Russia (Larzillière 2007), Milton-Edwards 2005, Thornton 2005).  Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) provide a further localised example, aiming to impose an Islamic 
government initially in Indonesia before the formation of a unified Southeast Asian 
Islamic state that stretched from southern Thailand across the Malay Peninsula and 
the Indonesian archipelago and into the southern Philippines (Shuja 2005).   
 
Religious nationalism can also be prominent where Islam is not the dominant religion 
or other religions are considered to be too influential and/or are responsible for moral 
denigration.  In countries like the Philippines and Thailand, Muslims are a minority 
and undertake violent nationalist struggles against the Catholic and Buddhist majority 
respectively while also attacking the perceived decadence of local Muslims.  These 
are, as Chalk (2002a) mentioned in respect to the Malay districts of Thailand, 
localised and nationalistic conflicts led largely by the Pattani United Liberation 
Organisation.  In the Philippines, MILF fight for localised issues but have links with 
JI and a commitment to a global agenda including a religious obligation to assist other 
jihadis (Abuza 2003, 2006, Chalk 2002b).  By comparison, another leading terror 
group, the Abu Sayyaf Group, is more militant than MILF advocating no co-existence 
with other religious groups who are considered to be the legitimate target of attack 
including the beheading of women and children.  The group is considered to be closer 
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to the global transnational networks.  Another Southeast Asian nation, Indonesia is 
the most populous Muslims country, with a greater aggregate population than the 
Arab Middle East, but faces tremendous pressures to maintain unity across a multi-
ethnic nation that JI seeks to exploit.  And in the Moluccas there is ethno-religious 
fighting between Christians and Muslims, supported by the militant Laskar Jihad 
(Houben 2003, Noorhaidi 2002).  It should be stressed, as identified in Chapter One, 
that the national against trans-national chasm which is found within Sunni Islam is 
much less noticeable within the smaller Shi’ite denomination with its closer 
association between groups and nation-states.   
 
Militant Islamic Trans-nationalism 
 
Groups associated with al-Qa’ida have sought to establish themselves as the sole 
representative of true Islam, often viewing themselves as vanguards whose actions 
and example will inspire and awaken Muslims to challenge Western nation-states and 
overthrow national governments.  By comparison with the nationalist militant 
Muslims, Sunni transnationalists outline religious obligations to defend Muslims 
across the world and to implement international change.  Some groups have been 
associated with a range of attacks that have been undertaken towards this end, 
including Sunnis attacking Shi’ites who are deemed infidels in Pakistan and Iraq.  
Processes behind the emergence of these groups connect closely to the debate about 
trans-nationalism and interconnect with the experiences Muslims are encountering 
across the world.  In some respects, these groups, like millions more moderate 
Muslims, appear to be what Appadurai (1996: 169) has described as ‘postnational’ 
and ‘divorced from territorial states’.  Recently within studies of nationalism, there 
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has been a growing emphasis placed upon transnationalism which Basch et al (1994: 
7) argue, is the process ‘by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social 
relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement.’  They undertake 
‘actions, make decisions, and develop subjectivities and identities embedded in 
networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to two or more nation-
states’.    
 
Developing upon Anderson’s ‘print capitalism’, Appadurai (1996) suggests that new 
forms of ‘electronic capitalism’ inherent within globalisation can have a similar, if 
not stronger, effect that enables the transmission of cultural features, values, symbols 
and meanings that extend beyond nation-states to transnationalism.  Appardurai is not, 
however, arguing in support of McLuhan’s ‘global village.’  Instead he suggests that 
the vernacular and domestication of globalisation at local levels results in 
hybridisation rather than homogeneity.  These cross cutting loyalties, while a feature 
of diasporas, can also incorporate indigenous people.  For many individuals though, 
this form of nationalism is not directly about the demand for self-determination.  
Nationalism often involves living in a stateless nation and is not therefore inevitably 
territorial.  Clearly these relations have particular resonance within diasporas while 
conversely often contributing to a reformulation of defensive national identity within 
societies, e.g. the rise of the extreme right within Britain, France and Germany and its 
correlation with migration and perceived threats.  Anderson (1998) describes the 
multi stranded relations and loyalties within diasporas as ‘long distance nationalism’ 
which is a consequence of evolving capitalism.  Like other forms of nationalism, the 
long distance version is also formed and reformed in relation to the ‘other’.  But 
Anderson argues that rather than long distance contributing to a weakening of resolve, 
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space can contribute to greater radicalism because individuals in the West and their 
immediate family are freed from the fear of prison, torture, or death.  The example of 
migrants highlights that the attachment to nation is not restricted to those living 
within territories, nor even specifically is it about land.   
 
For Roy (2004: 38), processes of migration interact with other factors like the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, closer political and economic ties between Muslim 
nation-states and Western governments and associated processes of globalisation, to 
contribute to what he describes as ‘deterritorialisation.’  This happens when, 
 
religion and culture no longer have a relationship with territory or given 
society… It means that religion has to define itself solely in terms of 
religion: there is no longer any social authority or social pressure to 
conform… . It has to define itself in comparison with all ‘other’ – other 
religions, other values, other environments. 
 
Solace for a minority within transnational communities feeling ill at ease, humiliated 
and stigmatised in societies where materialism dominates and is the benchmark of 
success, can be found within the neo-umma.  And for Roy ‘deterritorialisation’ can be 
experienced without the individual leaving their own country.  In these localised 
settings, westernisation and globalisation have challenged local values and are 
considered to threaten ethnic cultures and marginalise Islam.  
 
Again this is not to stress a uniformity of experience or collective identity.  The 
‘Muslim community’ within Europe, North America and Australasia consists of a 
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multitude of values, beliefs, customs and languages.  In other words, religion provides 
a unifier amongst neighbours, although even here practices and beliefs may be 
unidentifiable to neighbours.  Migrants and Western-born Muslims often have little in 
common and certainly do not share a communal identity.  These processes are 
noticeable among many migrants to the West and subsequent generations.  In 
different countries Muslims share experiences of racism and forms of covert 
discrimination provide barriers to integration and strengthen existing social and 
cultural networks.  The rise of Islamophobia has resulted in many Muslims uniting 
around that which leads to their exclusion, namely their religion, which becomes the 
basis for the formation of communal and status groups.   
 
Despite Muslims being born in the West their loyalties are being questioned.  Yet the 
overwhelming majority have not given any cause for nation-states to be concerned 
but government and societal reactions are contributing to processes of exclusion and 
the re-examination of identities.  Marranci’s (2006) research discovered that many 
Western-born Muslims, rather than feeling lost in-between the West and their familial 
country of origin, stressed their individuality allied to the umma which was 
considered to be shaped in a ‘community of emotion’ rather than Anderson’s 
‘imagined community.’  Within these perceptions Marranci discovered that Muslims 
were part of a spiritual community and people shared their experiences and emotions.  
Many rejected nationalist and ethnic divisions.  He reports on Western-born Muslims’ 
perceptions being heavily influenced by global media through which many attained 
Islamic education.  Their perceptions of the umma differed from their parents with 
greater emphasis placed upon shared identity and humiliation.  For example, a 
respondent from Paris suggested that ‘Islam is one and we should behave as one 
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nation only’ while another based in Italy commented ‘when you see what Palestinians 
and other Muslims around the world are suffering, you feel as if your family has been 
attacked and your brother or sister killed… the umma is like… when you go to a 
concert of pop-music, you don’t know anybody but feel part of the group’ (ibid. 
p107).  For in-migrants the umma is very much an ‘imagined community’ within 
which differences, including religious, nationalism and prejudice against other ethnic 
Muslim groups, can be observed.  Emotions also play an important role in facilitating 
unity beyond the locality to the wider community.  Khosrokhavar (2005) suggests 
that migrants share a sense of ‘non-belonging’.  In addition to problematic 
experiences in Western societies, migrants also share the sufferings of societies they 
have left, feelings strengthened by enhanced media coverage.  For these people, he 
argues, the umma provides a sense of certainty and allegiance.  In other words, many 
Muslims are refusing to compromise their beliefs in order to integrate with the 
incompatible perception of the Western nation and associated processes of 
Westernisation.  They are experiencing either individually or collectively perceived 
western neo-imperialism and are reacting in defence of the Islamic nation and sense 
of honour that comes from addressing the shame that the allegiance is feeling.  As the 
following discussion identifies, this is clearly apparent in the experiences of many 
migrant and Western born Muslims and is resulting in the ‘near’ and ‘far’ distinction 
being lost; Muslims in Britain are targeting their home country for attack, most 
notably in the London 2005 bombings. 
 
The most obvious example of militant transnationalism that attracted fighters and 
supporters from all over Muslim societies and communities can be found in the war in 
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union during the 1980s.  A fighter informed Gerges 
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(2006: 112) that the war ‘internationalized and militarized the jihadist movement 
further’.  Success against the Soviet Union gave confidence and legitimacy in the 
possibility of a global umma and the term became prominent within al-Qa’ida related 
pronouncements from an early stage.  For example, in December 1994, bin Laden 
declared ‘the banner of jihad is raised up high to restore to our umma its pride and 
honor, and in which the banner of God’s unity is raised once again over every stolen 
Islamic land, from Palestine to al-Andalus and other Islamic lands that were lost 
because of the betrayals of rulers and the feebleness of Muslims.’16  After attacks in 
Riyadh and Khobar, bin Laden expressed his admiration, declaring the perpetrators 
had ‘removed the shame from the forehead of our umma’. 17   Denouncing the 
feebleness, degradation and corruption of the umma and the Crusaders’ invasion of 
Muslim lands were to become regular features of public communications.  In 1996, 
bin Laden draws attention to massacres considered to be occurring against Muslims 
around the world.  Yet ‘the greatest disaster to befall the Muslims since the death of 
the Prophet Muhammad—is the occupation of Saudi Arabia, which is the cornerstone 
of the Islamic world’.18  Rectifying events in the ‘Islamic’ world generally and in 
Saudi Arabia specifically were early declared aims.   
 
A useful indicator of the transnational nature of groups associated with al-Qa’ida lies 
in the wide ranging membership across geographical boundaries.  Khosrokhavar 
(2005: 61) suggests that al-Qa’ida members ‘belong to a variety of communities… 
are involved in a plurality of cultures without belonging to any one of them.’  Hiro 
(2002) mentions that notebooks discovered after the fall of Kabul in 2001 identified 
al-Qa’ida associated representatives who originated from 26 different nationalities, 
while Bergen (2001) refers to 25 different ethnic nationalities involved in Afghan 
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training camps.  Breadth is also noticeable in the range of conflicts that trans-national 
militants engaged in after 1989.  Gerges (2005: 57) refers to jihadis defending co-
religionists in ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, the Philippines, Kashmir, Eritrea, 
Somalia, Burma, Tajikstan and elsewhere.’   
 
The geographical issues promoted by trans-national groups unsurprisingly differ from 
the specific geo political focus of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Kashmiri Jaish-e-
Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba.  A brief study of statements by bin Laden shows 
that following the 2001 attacks, attempts were made to rationalise the actions and 
broaden the appeal of this strand of militancy.  References were notable to ‘the umma 
of 1200 million Muslims’ that ‘is being slaughtered, in Palestine, in Iraq, Somalia, 
Western Sudan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Assam.’19  Greater 
attention is placed upon the plight of the Palestinians yet ironically in light of the 
centrality of the Palestinian struggle to militancy today, during the 1990s the appeal 
of other conflicts led to a downgrading and relative neglect of the Palestinian-Israeli 
dispute.  Even today bin Laden argues, the Palestinian cause must be subordinate to 
the global struggle.  In response to a question that the spate of references to the 
Palestinians was relatively new, bin Laden replied that ‘sometimes we find the right 
elements to push for one cause more than the other.  Last year’s blessed intifada 
helped us to push more for the Palestinian cause.  This push helps the other cause’.20  
He then argues that there is no conflict between attacking America and the Palestinian 
cause.  By comparison, Chechnya and other conflicts, while occasionally referenced, 
do not attract the same vocal or pragmatic support amongst militants.  This may be 
due to the lack of familiarity of Muslims with the region, language, history and the 
lack of symbolism that Chechens and the territory holds within trans-national 
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identities.  In other words, familiarity helps to strengthen international bonds and 
loyalties.  As McGregor (2006) observes, the struggle in Iraq has mobilised 
international jihadists at the expense of Chechnya for cultural, linguistic and possibly 
climatic reasons.  
 
Bin Laden sought to connect with Muslims everywhere through the use of the 
concept of the umma.  He has stated, ‘our concern is that our umma unites either 
under the Words of the Book of God or His Prophet, and that this nation should 
establish the righteous caliphate of our umma’.21  However the caliphate as a concept 
had largely been dormant since 192422 and had not been popular in many regions 
prior to that time period because it imposed Turkish rule over Arabs.  This leads 
Devji (2005) to suggest that the umma’s primary role is in deterritorialized space with 
no centre or periphery.  Later in 2003, the umma is explicitly described as a physical 
entity, with bin Laden hoping ‘that God blesses our umma with a state that includes 
all Muslims under its authority’.23  Such comments connect to Qutb’s24 belief that a 
‘Muslim’s nationality is his religion’.  Khosrokhavar (2005: 52) suggests that the 
modern discourse is addressed to individuals and not the community.  ‘It is addressed 
to creatures of flesh and blood, rather than to restricted groups of religious believers 
who have already been shaped by the religious tradition and who do not have to be 
convinced of Islam’s legitimacy.’  As Khosrokhavar (ibid.: 61) acknowledges when 
discussing Qutb’s contributions, the emphasis upon individualism is considered in 
relation to community, a neo-umma is promoted that transcends national boundaries 
based upon beliefs rather than ethnicity, race or existing nation.  In the place of 
existing geographical barriers ‘a mythical Islamic community’ is promoted.   
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By comparison, Shi’ite trans-national sentiments have been influenced by clergy 
rooted within a nation-state.  For example, the Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini’s (1900-1989) approach is instructive in reconciling divergent interests.  
After declaring that Islam has no frontiers, Khomeini then sought to utilise religion to 
legitimise the new regime within the Iranian boundaries.  Reference to Islamic 
traditions and perceptions of ideological commonality were embedded within 
transnationalism and helped arouse broader support.  Through existing religious links, 
the Iranian government were able to establish organisational networks in order to 
export their revolution.  Hezbollah, the Shi’ite group in Lebanon supported by Iran, 
also seek to promote cross sectarian unity between Sunni and Shi’ite.  This is 
noticeable in the emphasis placed upon the liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine, 
factors introduced earlier by Khomeini to try to mobilise, declaring that ‘Israel is a 
cancerous goiter that occupies the liver of the umma: Palestine’.25   
 
A Route from Islamic Nation-State to Transnational Islamic Nation 
 
When seeking to understand the militants’ expansion into trans-nationalism, al-
Zayyat’s account of Zawahiri’s transformation from leading Egyptian militant into a 
central figure within the wider movement is illustrative.  Initially Zawahiri considered 
the internal enemy to be the main source of confrontation, arguing ‘fight those of the 
disbelievers who are close to you’.26  In this, he and Islamic Jihad were not alone.  
Gerges (2005) examines jihadis’ writings between the 1970s and early 1990s and 
found an overwhelming nationalist emphasis upon local affairs.  Global issues and the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict were neglected beyond the territories and Lebanon.  
Localised militants were vehemently opposed to American actions, Western values, 
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its perceived global dominance and neo colonialism.  However they felt that this was 
happening because of the collusion and/or weakness of secular Muslim leaders.  If the 
leaders could be overthrown then the relationship with the West would be 
transformed and societies would become Islamic.  This is not to claim that there were 
no attacks against the West or its representatives.  As Gerges details, Egyptian 
militants killed tourists and the Algerian GIA attacked targets in France.  But these 
were not part of a concerted campaign, were connected to localised issues and caused 
tremendous consternation within the respective militant groups and supporters.  
Zawahiri’s participation in the International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and 
Crusaders in 1998 indicated a philosophical and pragmatic break in his approach.  
The attack shifted from the Egyptian government to the West, and in particular the 
United States and Israel.  On reflection however it was apparent by late 1997 that 
Zawahiri was shifting focus, emphasised by the title of an article published at that 
time ‘Muslim Umma, Unite in Your Jihad on America’.   
 
A number of reasons have been provided for Zawahiri’s transformation.  These 
include the failure of violence to undermine the Egyptian government, widespread 
arrests and detention of members and supporters which had weakened the militants, 
financial shortages, internal divisions, state infiltration and closer relations with bin 
Laden which had originated in the war against the Soviet Union.  Zawahiri explains 
in Knights under the Prophet’s Banner that following the victory in Afghanistan 
against the Soviet Union, expectations were high that jihadis would be able to 
mobilise the ‘masses’ to overthrow corrupt government.  However across Muslim 
nation-states like Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, governments remained 
firmly established and a fundamental shift in strategy was required, namely shifting 
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attention to the ‘far enemy.’  As the militant Kemal informed Gerges (2006) 114) 
‘Islamists overestimated their real strength and felt overconfident… . They 
miscalculated’. In other words, failure against one target led to a redirecting of 
attentions to a different enemy that had long been hated by militants and now became 
the principle focus of attack.  By attacking the United States, Israel and the West 
generally, it was felt that co-religionists across the umma would rally to their support.  
Through the allegiance with bin Laden, al-Zayyat (2004) suggests that Zawahiri and 
Islamic Jihad members were able to attain sanctuary and new credibility while 
retaining the capability of attacking Egyptian targets.  In other words a multitude of 
largely pragmatic factors resulted in the change in approach.  
 
Nations within the ‘Islamic Nation’ 
 
Today there is contradictory evidence about how extensive transnationalism actually 
is.  For example, despite the strong association of Somalia and Sudan with al-Qa’ida, 
Seeseman (2006) argues that militants in these countries seek to deliver local and 
national agendas that seek to purify social relations and politicise religion.  Few 
people become actively engaged in international terrorism.  Hamas’ strategic targets 
are localised, overwhelmingly associated with Israel and selected specifically for the 
purposes of national liberation.  By comparison, trans-nationalists associated with al-
Qa’ida are considered to be rootless, aiming to implement the shari’ah across Muslim 
communities but without a specific locality to fight (and die for in the case of 
Palestinian and Iranian ‘martyrs’) and a less clearly defined enemy.   
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Transnational militants argue against national territorial allegiance exemplified by al-
Zarqawi’s claim that ‘I am global, no land is my country’.27   The challenge to 
geographical boundaries is accompanied by religious trans-nationalism.  As one 
jihadist told Gerges (2005: 63) ‘we realized we were a nation [umma] that had a 
distinguished place among nations.  Otherwise what would make me leave Saudi 
Arabia – and I am of Yemeni origin – to go and fight in Bosnia.’  Yet even within the 
actions of the most prominent figures associated with al-Qa’ida, there are 
discrepancies.  Bin Laden’s roots in Saudi Arabia and the strong association of al-
Qa’ida with other Saudi members, exemplified by fifteen of the nineteen September 
2001 attackers originating from the kingdom, appear at odds with the trans-national 
approach.  Similarly, although pronouncements associated with al-Qa’ida cover a 
range of issues in different locations, the Saudi regime attracts a disproportionate 
amount of attention.28  As Gerges (2006) remarked, many of those located in the 
Afghan camps on behalf of al-Qa’ida had already internalised nationalist sentiments.  
These resulted in suspicion and resentment about the numerical dominance of 
Egyptians29 within the inner circle and led to bin Laden broadening the leadership’s 
geographical representation.  Steinberg (2005) comments on the approach that trans-
national groups like Zarqawi’s former network in Iraq must adopt to incorporate 
actions that appeal to potential multi-national members.  Recruitment is easier if the 
group includes targeted regimes in potential members’ home countries.  Zarqawi 
himself was a good example of this, retaining an active interest in Jordanian affairs 
and seemingly heavily involved in the 2005 suicide bombings in Amman.  Roy 
(2004: 62) encapsulates the tensions within militancy generally, and al-Qa’ida in 
particular when stating, ‘despite their claim to be supranational, most Islamist 
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movements have been shaped by national particularities.  Sooner or later they tend to 
express national interests, even under the pretext of Islamist ideology.’   
 
Trans/national Allegiance and Sacrifice 
 
A central question raised by Anderson relates to the extent of the attachment that 
people felt for the imagined communities that meant they would be willing to die for 
it.  For Anderson, this is the outcome of the perceptions of the purity and inherent 
goodness that people feel for the nation.  In other words, they possess a strong 
conviction in the virtue of the nation and would sacrifice themselves for the wider 
entity.  In this sense, Anderson (2006) compares this faith akin to religious 
imaginings, although he failed subsequently to develop these similarities, as Smith 
(2003) points out.  For Smith, individual and collective sacrifice is essential to 
understanding nationalist mobilisation.  Sacrifices for the nation become part of 
common memory, remembered and celebrated, but Smith suggests this is not unique 
to modernity.  Throughout history people have died for broader communities, with 
their actions immortalised.  In regions that were not nations according to 
contemporary definitions, holy places became the destination for pilgrimages like the 
Wailing Wall for Jews and Mecca for Muslims, fostering solidarity and cultural 
consciousness.  Defeat and sacrifice is particularly emotive for believers and is 
widely commemorated on particular dates and at certain locations.  The crucifixion of 
Jesus, fall of Jerusalem, and battle of Karbala where Hussein, the prophet’s grandson, 
was killed, continue to resonate throughout religious sentiments and reinforce 
loyalties.  Clearly nationalism not only relies on sacrifice but also on the use of 
violence on its behalf.  Hassner (2005) notes that nation-states have sought to 
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monopolise violence and implemented processes designed at internal pacification.  
People are therefore only encouraged to commit acts of violence on behalf of the 
nation, frequently through inter-state war.  And as McCrone (1998) notes, warfare 
between 1870 and the First World War was instrumental in the formation of national 
consciousness within Europe.  For militant Muslims, Islam ‘legitimises sacred death 
in the service of the community or umma by making it part of the fabric of a war that 
enjoys religious legitimacy, namely jihad’ (Khosrokhavar 2005: 52).  A recent 
notable example of this link between sacrifice and religious nationalism can be found 
in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88).  At the commencement of the conflict, Khomeini 
utilised religious discourse and the significance of sacrifice within Shi’ism stemming 
from the martyrdom of Husain, in a massive mobilisation of the population to defend 
the Iranian nation.  This is exemplified in Khomeini’s claim that ‘the more people die 
for our cause, the stronger we become.’  Reuter (2004: 34) describes the sounds of the 
‘human waves’ of the Iranian army, shouting ‘Ya Karbala! Ya Hussein! Ya 
Khomeini!’ as they walked towards machine guns and death.  The willingness, even 
desire, of the largely youthful recruits to die in the cause of Iran had a huge symbolic 
significance both within the country and the opposing Iraqi army.  Similar attitudes 
on a much smaller scale were also noticeable within the protests against the Shah 
before the revolution, when unarmed demonstrators would confront armed military 
personnel resulting in the ‘martyrdom’ of many.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the obvious disagreements within the sociology of nationalism, there is a 
general consensus that nationalism emphasises similarity, and by implication, 
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difference.  Islamic nationalism and/or transnationalism discourse provides a sense of 
identity around an ‘imagined community’ for supporters that places emphasis upon 
shared similarity with others.  These loyalties are very much products of their time, 
associated with processes of modernisation, state-formation and globalisation that 
have contributed to closer allegiances within and across geographical regions.  
However, as Smith would point out, these relationships are built upon religious values, 
symbols, perceptions of historical events and interplay between the past and present 
which help provide the legitimacy for religious nationalism today.  Within nationalist 
struggles, contested territories frequently share religious perceptions of sacred space.  
The collective loyalties that are prominent today within militant Islam are partly a 
consequence of recent developments within societies, international relations and 
processes of globalisation.  But they are also the outcome of long term processes that 
can be traced to the heroes, sacrifices and purity of the ‘Golden Age’ and the 
immemorial qualities of the ‘nation’ that in turn provide the ‘maps’ for the road to 
national destiny and “moralities”’.30  
 
Today, the struggle over strategy remains deeply divisive within the militant 
movement culminating, Gerges (2005) argues, in a civil war within jihadism between 
transnationalists and religious nationalists who have considerable numerical 
supremacy.  For the former, the failure of the latter proved the need for broadening 
the attack.  But for the latter, the actions of the former were self-defeating, proving 
detrimental to militancy generally and frequently localised struggles specifically.  
Certainly the conflict is noticeable within oral and written communications, with 
components of both strategies vehemently denouncing the other through speeches, 
websites, books, journals and pamphlets.  Groups like Al-Jama’a have been vitriolic 
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in their statements about the transnationalists’ misinterpretations and distortions of 
Islamic texts.  Gerges’ (2005: 229) study of jihadis led him to conclude that ‘there is 
a general realignment within the jihadist current against, not in favour of, Al Qaeda 
and global jihad.’ Equally, groups associated with al-Qa’ida are bitterly critical of the 
nationalist focus and in particular alliances with ‘near’ enemies.  For example, Al-
Zawahiri has strongly denounced Hamas signing the Mecca agreement, an act which 
he suggests shows a ‘loss of leadership’ and the fact that the group has ‘sunk in the 
swamp of surrender,’ joining ‘Sadat's [procession] of humiliation and capitulation...’ 
and of ‘abandoning not only the [Islamic] land but, more importantly, shari'a law – 
and all for the sake of securing a place in the Palestinian government’ (MEMRI 2007).   
 
Considerable disagreement within the militant movement about what constitutes the 
essence of nation and nationalism raises issues about where Islamic government/s 
should control and which groups and symbols are legitimate targets towards 
achieving those ends.  A range of Islamic sources is utilised to try to support opposing 
viewpoints.  The picture is further blurred by the range of actions that are undertaken 
that support both national and trans-national objectives and, conversely, the extent of 
sectarian attacks between Muslim groups.  By implication, emphasis upon similarities 
as the basis for collective solidarity excludes the different ‘other,’ people, groups and 
‘nations’ that do not possess the requisite characteristics.  This process is also 
accompanied by explicit denunciation of the ‘other’, whether Jews, Christians, 
Hindus, people from the West or even moderate Muslims and other denominations. 
Yet this behaviour is consistent with nations and competitive nationalism and shares 
similarities with the earlier involvement of Islam in struggles against colonial control.   
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The territorial demands of Muslim groups seeking independence are easier to 
understand according to Western precepts.  Religion and nationalism are integral to 
struggles against ‘others’ in the pursuit of freedom and territory.  Groups associated 
with al-Qa’ida are more difficult.  They need to be considered as part of a trans-
national movement that aims to utilise the umma concept and unite Muslims around 
the world in their struggle against the West and localised associates.  Militant 
transnationalism has been formed through broader processes of global 
communications and improved and more comprehensive education systems, often 
sponsored by secular nation-states.  These have contributed to Muslims being more 
cognizant about Islam and militant interpretations and national and global events that 
these perceptions draw upon.  Exposure to the concept of the umma, and supra 
national communities within the West and Muslim societies, provide a framework for 
behaviour and help to provide security and sense of purpose and collective identity 
that contributes towards greater empathy for Muslims in (other) troubled parts of the 
world.  In these circumstances where local nation-states are seen to be failing, secular 
nationalism is not firmly embedded and international systems appear overwhelmingly 
oppositional, many people are attracted by transnational militant Islam and the idea of 
a super-state and associated collective identities.  Ultimately this transnational 
conflict is driven by a desire to replace Western military, political and cultural 
influences in Muslim territories with Islamic tenets based upon a synthesis of 
contemporary and historical discourse, images and symbols.  The discussion connects 
into an ‘imagined community’ and is inspired by the ‘Golden Age’ of Muhammed 
and the early caliphs.  In a number of ways, this trans-nationalism is similar to more 
‘conventional’ forms of nationalism and the greater application of theories and 
concepts from the study of nationalism may help to further enhance levels of 
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understanding about the phenomenon.  The interrelationships between secular and 
religious, national and transnational processes are further explored in the following 
chapter through the adaptation of Max Weber’s concept of social closure. 
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1 For further details see for example, Hobsbawn (1990) and Horsman and Marshall (1994). 
2 Durkheim is quoted in McCrone (1998: 18). 
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4 Important exceptions include Chatterjee (1993), Jaffrelot (2002), Juergensmeyer (1993), Kinnvall 
(2002), Rieffer (2003), Smith (2003) and Van der Veer (1994). 
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6 Cited in Gerges (2006: 111).  
7 Cited in Kepel (2005: 43). 
8 Al-Zawahiri is reported in Ulph, (2006: 4). 
9 Al-Aziz is reported in Lapidus (2002). 
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11 Ibid. p.819. 
12 Quoted in Terdman (2005: 6). 
13 Point raised by Pargeter (2006 TM 30/11/6). 
14 Quoted in McGregor (2006: 3). 
15 For example, a declaration made by a Chechen group holding hostages in a Moscow cinema in 2002, 
stated ‘Every nation has the right to self-determination, but Russia has taken that way from the 
Chechen people and today we want to take back that right granted to us — and to all other nations — 
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by Allah the Most Gracious, the right to freedom and self-determination.’ (quoted in Larzillière 2007: 
100). 
16 Bin Laden is cited in Lawrence (2005:14). 
17 Ibid. p. 74. 
18 Ibid. p.25. 
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28 Bin Laden has tried to embed the attention upon Saudi Arabia within the wider struggle, arguing 
‘this (Saudi) conflict is partly a local conflict but in other respects it is conflict between world heresy 
and with it today’s apostates —under the leadership of America on the one hand, and on the other, the 
Islamic nation with brigades of the mujahideen in its vanguard’ (quoted in Fradkin 2005: 6-7). 
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played within international Islamic movements.  For example, in the 1950s, many members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood were denied opportunities in Egypt because of their religious beliefs and gained 
employment in other Muslim societies and communities, especially in the Gulf states.   
30 Smith (2003: 217). 
